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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MISSOURI’S SVP LAW: TIME FOR A CHANGE?

INTRODUCTION
The purposes of civil commitments are incapacitation—to protect society or
the patient—and treatment. The idea behind such confinements is that a patient
is “sick” and dangerous, that he must be locked up to be treated, and that when
he gets “well,” he will be released.
While the statutory scheme is constitutional as written, I am doubtful about
its constitutionality as applied. I concur in these cases, however, because I
believe we should defer the constitutional questions to another day after seeing
how the “sexually violent predator” law works in practice. The practices of the
state over the next few years will show whether there is a meaningful attempt
to treat those previously determined to be sick and dangerous, or whether these
offenders will simply be warehoused without treatment and without
meaningful efforts to re-integrate them into society.
For those labeled as “sexually violent predators,” the question is whether
this confinement is likely to be a life sentence, without meaningful treatment,
and without an attempt to tailor the infringement on liberty to that needed to
effect treatment and to protect society.
....
Most importantly, the state must show through its confinement and
treatment under the statute that the statute serves a proper non-punishment
purpose. A principal premise of their confinement is treatment. If an inmate is
at all susceptible to treatment, the state has a duty to provide that treatment. If
the state simply warehouses these men, without appropriate treatment and
without a meaningful means to achieve re-integration with society—rights that
are accorded to other mental patients—their constitutional rights will be
violated.
. . . [I]f this statute is used simply to impose life sentences of confinement
based upon a labeling of the inmates’ thoughts; this Court will have a
1
constitutional duty to take another look.

On August 30, 1998, Governor Mel Carnahan signed a series of laws that
established the Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services, more

1. In re Care & Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 176, 182 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(Wolff, J., concurring).
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commonly referred to as SORTS. 2 Missouri Governor Carnahan had pushed
for the creation of such a facility throughout the 1990s, after a sex offender
from St. Louis County claimed that he would molest children again after his
release from prison, in order to embarrass county officials. 3 SORTS is based at
the Southeast Missouri Mental Health Center in Farmington, Missouri, but the
number of confined individuals has grown to the point that dozens of patients
are also housed at Fulton State Hospital. 4 SORTS began confining individuals
in 1999, with the number of patients currently reaching approximately 200,
with somewhere around twenty patients being admitted each year. 5 The cost of
such a program is anything but cheap. SORTS costs taxpayers $25 million per
year, which comes out to more than $300 per patient, per day. 6 Since the
program’s inception, not one person has completed treatment. 7 After seventeen
years, a federal court in Missouri issued what could be a landmark decision
with respect to Missouri’s civil commitment process. 8 In Van Orden v.
Schafer, a federal judge found that the SORTS civil commitment program’s
confinement of individuals who no longer meet the criteria for commitment
renders the Missouri program unconstitutional as applied. 9 This Comment
intends to show why such a ruling is the correct interpretation of Missouri’s
involuntary civil commitment process.
This Comment seeks to examine the process of committing a sexually
violent predator under Missouri law as well as the legality of the confinement
facility itself. Part I of this Comment will look at the legal history of
involuntary civil commitment laws in the United States. Part II will discuss
Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Law, with a special emphasis on
the process of confining an individual offender. Part III will then analyze the
clinical assessment of a sex offender, a topic that has caused controversy in the
fields of both law and psychology. Part IV then details the inner workings of
SORTS, highlighting the many problems that plague the facility and that
ultimately hinder the treatment process. Part V will then look at the recent

2. SMMHC – Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services, MO. DEP’T OF MENTAL
HEALTH, http://dmh.mo.gov/smmhc/sorts_about.html [http://perma.cc/9SUD-7NWJ] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2016). The law became effective on January 1, 1999. Id.
3. Jesse Bogan, Is Missouri’s Sex-Crime Program a Ticking Time Bomb?, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/is-missouri-s-sex-crimeprogram-a-ticking-bomb/article_005d818e-ab5a-5006-8f97-629f787ce68b.html [http://perma.cc/
KF6H-D3QX].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Van Orden v. Schafer, No. 4:09-cv-00971 AGF, 2015 WL 5315753 (E.D. Mo. Sept.
11, 2015).
9. Id. at *3.
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decision in Van Orden v. Schafer and analyze why the court came to the
conclusion that it did. The conclusion of this Comment will summarize the
various arguments criticizing Missouri’s SVP Law and suggest that the
Missouri Supreme Court “take another look” at the way these laws have been
applied throughout their fourteen-year history.
Judge Wolff’s concurring opinion in In re Care & Treatment of Norton
should serve to constantly remind Missouri courts of the importance of
examining the application of Missouri’s SVP Law. Simply because the purpose
stated in the statute renders the scheme constitutional does not mean that the
same scheme automatically remains constitutional throughout its lifetime. This
Comment seeks to examine the very question that Judge Wolff posed back in
2004: Has Missouri’s SVP Law been constitutionally applied?
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Constitutionality of the Civil Commitment of Sexual Offenders

The first statute, which provided for civil commitment of sexual offenders
and was upheld by the United States Supreme Court, was Chapter 369 Section
1 of the Minnesota State Code (1939). 10 The Court upheld the constitutionality
of this statute in the 1940 case Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court. 11
Charles Pearson sought a writ of prohibition ordering the probate court to
“desist from proceeding against him as a ‘psychopathic personality’ under
Chapter 369.” 12 Chapter 369 made it lawful to indefinitely confine individuals
who had a “habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters” and displayed an
“utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses,” making one “likely to
attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrolled and uncontrollable [sexual] desire.” 13 This marked the first time
the Supreme Court upheld a statute that provided for civil commitment. 14
10. See Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 270–77 (1940). In 1939,
the Minnesota legislature enacted a statute enabling involuntary civil commitment. Today, the
statute allows for the involuntary hospitalization of any person that meets the statutory definition
of “psychopathic personality.” The statute’s commitment procedure is similar to the procedures
used to commit people who are considered mentally ill and dangerous (MID). However, the MID
commitment statute requires a judicial determination that a person is both mentally ill and
dangerous, while the Psychopathic Personality statute allows the state to hospitalize a person
indefinitely, without first concluding that the person suffers from an illness known to medical
science. C. Peter Erlinder, Minnesota’s Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the “Politically Ill”, 19
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 99, 100 (1993).
11. Rachel Woodell Hill, Seconds Anyone? Using the Missouri SVP Law to Punish After
Time Served, 74 MO. L. REV. 1191, 1196 (2009).
12. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson, 309 U.S. at 270.
13. Id. at 273.
14. Robert Bilbrey, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: A Misguided Attempt
to Solve a Serious Problem, 55 J. MO. B. 321, 322 (1999).
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Pearson alleged that the statute was vague and indefinite in addition to
violating the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 15 However, the Supreme Court dismissed Pearson’s
contention that the statute was too vague or indefinite to be constitutional since
the statute laid out the aforementioned distinct criteria. 16 As to the due process
contention, the Court found that the right to counsel, as well as the right to a
hearing on the matter, was sufficient to protect any fundamental due process
rights. 17 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court dismissed any equal
protection concerns by finding that the legislature was within the bounds of the
Constitution when it identified a class of individuals that posed a greater threat
to society. 18
B.

“Non-Punitive” Involuntary Confinement: Kansas v. Hendricks

Leroy Hendricks was the first person that the State of Kansas attempted to
commit under a law that provided for the civil commitment of sexually violent
felons. 19 The Kansas legislature initially passed this law in reaction to a 1993
crime in which a man who had previously been convicted of rape was again
found guilty of raping and murdering a University of Kansas student. 20 The
statute provided for a commitment hearing where the state has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt 21 that the individual “has been convicted of
or charged with a sexually violent offense and . . . suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in
the predatory acts of sexual violence.” 22
Hendricks had been convicted of engaging in sexual activities with two
thirteen-year-old boys. 23 Just before he was scheduled to be released, after
serving nearly ten years in prison, the state filed a petition seeking Hendricks’s
civil confinement as a sexually violent predator. 24 During Hendricks’s
treatment, he admitted that he was unable to control his urge to molest
children, even going so far as to state that “the only sure way he could keep
from sexually abusing children in the future was ‘to die.’” 25 Hendricks
requested a jury trial, pursuant to the Kansas statute, at which a jury found

15. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson, 309 U.S. at 272.
16. Id. at 274.
17. Hill, supra note 11, at 1197.
18. Minnesota ex el. Pearson, 309 U.S. at 274–75.
19. Bilbrey, supra note 14, at 321.
20. Id. at 323.
21. Id. The standard of proof with respect to civil commitment hearings varies from state to
state. See infra Part II(B) for the standard in Missouri.
22. Bilbrey, supra note 14, at 323 (emphasis added).
23. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997).
24. Id. at 353–54.
25. Id. at 355.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a sexually violent predator. 26 The
Kansas Supreme Court, however, overturned Hendricks’s civil commitment,
finding that the statute was unconstitutional. 27 On review, the United States
Supreme Court centered its analysis on the term “mental abnormality” to
determine whether the term satisfied the due process requirements of the
Constitution. 28 The issue at the heart of this case was whether or not the
Kansas statute was essentially functioning as an ex post facto law, “[a] law
enacted after commission of the offense and which punishes the offense by
extending the term of confinement.” 29 If the stated intention of the Kansas law,
which was to provide treatment for these offenders, was merely serving as a
pretext, then that would indicate that the actual purpose of the statute was to
punish. 30
The Court ultimately concluded that the term did satisfy all due process
requirements, concluding:
States have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil
detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby
pose a danger to the public health and safety. . . . We have consistently upheld
such involuntary commitment statutes provided the confinement takes place
31
pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards.

Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, sought to warn against the dangers
that exist when the civil confinement process is used in conjunction with the
criminal process. 32 According to Justice Kennedy, “[t]he concern . . . is
whether it is the criminal system or the civil system which should make the
decision in the first place. . . . [W]hile incapacitation is a goal common to both
the criminal and civil systems of confinement, retribution and general
deterrence are reserved for the criminal system alone.” 33 Justice Kennedy
concluded by pointing out that the statute, as written, conforms to the Court’s
precedent, but if civil confinement became a “mechanism for retribution or
general deterrence,” then that would cease to be the case. 34

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 354–55.
Bilbrey, supra note 14, at 323.
Id.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 371–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 373.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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II. MISSOURI’S SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR LAW
A.

The Civil Commitment Process

In 1999, Missouri passed its very own sexually violent predator law,
patterned after the Kansas statute that was the focus of the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Kansas v. Hendricks. 35 The civil commitment portion of this statute
makes it lawful for the state to commit individuals who have been convicted of
certain sexual offenses and place such individuals in a state mental health
facility after they have served their criminal sentences. 36 In order to reach the
determination of whether a person is a “sexually violent predator,” it must be
shown that he or she has a “mental abnormality.” 37 A “mental abnormality” as
defined by the Missouri state legislature is “a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others.” 38
Before an individual can be confined involuntarily in Missouri, there are
several procedures that must be performed in accordance with the state law. 39
This process begins when a prison inmate is “flagged” 360 days prior to his or
her scheduled release by either the Department of Corrections or the
Department of Mental Health. 40 A person is “flagged” if it is believed that he
or she would be a danger to society upon release from prison, and this is
communicated via a written notice to the attorney general, which includes the
person’s name, offense history, and any treatment either administered to or
refused by the convicted sex offender. 41 A multidisciplinary panel then reviews
the individual’s case in an effort to determine if the person qualifies to be
committed as a sexually violent predator. 42 If the multidisciplinary panel
determines that the person in question meets the criteria for a sexually violent
predator, then the report is sent to a prosecutor’s review committee that has
been appointed by the attorney general. 43 For the case to proceed, the

35. Bilbrey, supra note 14, at 321.
36. Id. The state mental health facility in Missouri is named SORTS and is located in
Farmington, Missouri. Bogan, supra note 3.
37. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(5) (2015).
38. Id. § 632.480(2).
39. Id. § 632.483.
40. Id. § 632.483.1.
41. Id. § 632.483.2.
42. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.483.4 (2015).
43. Id. § 632.483.5.
The prosecutors coordinators training council established pursuant to section 56.760 shall
appoint a five-member prosecutors’ review committee composed of a cross section of
county prosecutors from urban and rural counties. No more than three shall be from urban
counties, and one member shall be the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

MISSOURI’S SVP LAW: TIME FOR A CHANGE?

717

prosecutor’s review committee must decide, by a majority vote, whether to
recommend to the attorney general that the individual be committed as a
sexually violent predator. 44 Upon such a finding, the attorney general may file
a petition in the probate division of the circuit court in which the person was
convicted. 45 It is then for the probate judge to determine whether or not there is
probable cause sufficient to establish that this individual is a sexually violent
predator. 46 If the probate judge does indeed come to such a conclusion, he then
must order the person to be taken into custody and confined to a secure
facility. 47 At this point, the confined individual has the right to request notice
of a hearing to contest the probate judge’s finding. At the hearing, the accused
is entitled to “be represented by an attorney, to present evidence, to crossexamine witnesses, and to view and copy all reports that have been filed with
the court.” 48 Then, the court determines if there should be a full probable cause
hearing on the matter. If the probate judge’s probable cause finding is upheld,
then the accused individual must remain in a secure facility where an exam is
to be conducted within sixty days by a psychiatrist or psychologist appointed
by the Department of Mental Health. 49 Within sixty days of completion of this
examination, the person has the right to a trial by jury and, again, to an
attorney. 50 If the fact finder determines that there is clear and convincing
evidence that the person is a sexually violent predator, “the person shall be
committed to the custody of the director of the department of mental health for
control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality
has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.” 51
B.

Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence

It is well known that when someone is sentenced to life in prison, or
convicted of any crime for that matter, the prosecution bears the burden of
proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 52 To show that an
individual is a sexually violent predator in Missouri, and thus subject to
involuntary confinement, the standard of proof is a much different one: “The
court or jury shall determine whether, by clear and convincing evidence, the

person was convicted or committed pursuant to chapter 552, if the conviction was in this
state.
Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Bilbrey, supra note 14, at 324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bilbrey, supra note 14, at 324.
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495.2 (2015).
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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person is a sexually violent predator.” 53 In 1999, when the Missouri legislature
initially implemented the statutory scheme to confine sexually violent
predators, the state was required to show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the
individual had previously committed sexually violent acts and possessed a
mental abnormality that made him or her likely to reoffend if released.” 54 In
2006, Missouri amended its SVP Law, lowering the burden of proof to the
clear and convincing evidence standard. 55 These amendments created serious
constitutional concerns, calling the legality of the entire statutory scheme into
question. 56 The Missouri Supreme Court was soon after faced with addressing
these concerns, as it did not take long for individuals to experience the
ramifications of this new standard of proof. 57 The court, in In re Care &
Treatment of Van Orden, examined the various burdens of proof that are
assigned to categories of cases. 58 Specifically, the court noted that civil cases,
involving a “fundamental right or liberty,” require a standard of clear and
convincing evidence to “lessen[] the risk of an erroneous decision.”59
However, in a criminal case, the state has the burden of proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to “impose[] almost the entire risk of error
on the state.” 60 It follows, logically, that more individuals will be committed
using this lesser clear and convincing standard. The issue, here, is that these
individuals are potentially losing their freedom, a right only formerly revoked
in criminal proceedings, not in civil ones.
In In re Care & Treatment of Van Orden, Richard Wheeler and John Van
Orden each appealed their civil commitments to the Missouri Supreme Court. 61
Wheeler had a sexually violent history involving children, stemming back to
1967 when he was charged with sodomy for allegedly molesting his nine-yearold male cousin when he was twenty years of age. 62 Wheeler had multiple
convictions related to sexual abuse over the next three decades. 63 In 1997, he
was convicted of first-degree statutory sodomy, involving a four-year-old boy
and was sentenced to ten years in prison. 64 During this sentence, Wheeler

53. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.495.1 (emphasis added). If a jury does indeed determine that a
person is a sexually violent predator, then that determination must be by unanimous verdict. Id.
Any determination that an individual is a sexually violent predator may be appealed. Id.
54. Hill, supra note 11, at 1191.
55. Id. at 1205.
56. Id. at 1191.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1206.
59. Hill, supra note 11, at 1206.
60. Id.
61. In re Care & Treatment of Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 581–82 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
62. Id. at 582.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 582–83.
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refused to submit to sex offender treatment, and, prior to his release, a
psychologist for the Department of Corrections sent notice to the attorney
general after determining that he may meet the criteria for a sexually violent
predator. 65 After a probable cause hearing, a court ultimately determined that
Wheeler met the definition of a sexually violent predator and ordered his
confinement. 66
John Van Orden first pled guilty to sexual misconduct, at the age of
twenty-five, for sexual contact with his sixteen-year-old niece. 67 Five years
later, Van Orden was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse for a crime that
involved his five-year-old daughter. 68 In 1998, he was sentenced to seven years
in prison after being convicted of first-degree child molestation for the abuse
of a four-year-old female. 69 After completing the first two phases of sex
offender treatment, Van Orden was released on parole in 2004. 70 After
violating the conditions of his parole twice, he was transferred to the Fulton
Reception and Diagnostic Center. 71 One month later, the Department of
Corrections sent written notice to the attorney general that Van Orden may
meet the definition of a sexually violent predator. 72 A jury trial was held in
May of 2007, and Van Orden objected to the burden of proof, maintaining that
“clear and convincing evidence” should be defined to the jury. 73 Van Orden
argued that the jury instructions should include certain additional language to
aid the jury in assessing whether the state’s burden had been met. 74 The trial
court overruled the objection, and the jury found that Van Orden was a
sexually violent predator, after which confinement was ordered. 75
65. Id. at 583.
66. In re Care & Treatment of Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 583.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In re Care & Treatment of Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 583.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 583–84.
74. Id. at 584. Van Orden submitted the following specific instructions to be submitted to the
jury:
Clear and convincing evidence means that you are clearly convinced of the affirmative of
the proposition to be proved. This does not mean that there may not be contrary
evidence . . . For evidence to be clear and convincing it must instantly tilt the scales in the
affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and your mind is left with
unabiding conviction that the evidence is true.
Id.
75. Id. at 584. At trial, the state produced a psychologist who diagnosed Van Orden with
pedophilia and an anti-personality disorder. The psychologist further testified that, in his opinion,
Van Orden was more likely than not to reoffend if he was not committed. The witness based his
assessment of Van Orden on the results of the Static-99 actuarial test, which measures the
likelihood of reoffending, and on his own assessment of Van Orden. Id. at 583–84.
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Both Wheeler and Van Orden argued that Section 632.495 under Missouri
law was unconstitutional in that it violated due process by not requiring the
state to prove an individual was a sexually violent predator beyond a
reasonable doubt. 76 The court’s analysis distinguished the civil confinement
category of cases from criminal cases, citing the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Addington v. Texas. 77 In Addington, the Supreme Court
found that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not constitutionally required
because the state was not exercising its power in a punitive sense and the
continuing opportunities for review minimized the risk of error.” 78 Ultimately,
however, the Supreme Court in Addington “found that the precise burden,
whether clear and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, was a
matter of state law.” 79 “Whether a beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and
convincing evidence burden of proof is utilized to commit sexually violent
predators is a matter of legislative prerogative.” 80 The Missouri Supreme Court
reasoned that proceedings such as the one before them concerning Wheeler and
Van Orden were civil ones, even though they involved a liberty interest. 81 It
was the court’s view that the state civil commitment statute served the purpose
of both protecting society from possible violent predators, while also providing
individuals with necessary treatment. 82 The court cited several “safeguards”
included within the statute that guarded against “erroneous commitment,” such
as the requirement that the person have previously committed a sexual offense,
and that the person have the right to a probable cause hearing and the right to a
trial by jury. 83 Finally, the court distinguished sexually violent predator cases
from criminal proceedings by pointing out under the statute that “if
commitment is ordered, the term of commitment is not indefinite.” 84 The
court’s final rationale for upholding this clear and convincing evidence

76. In re Care & Treatment of Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 584–85.
77. Id. at 585; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (internal citation omitted).
81. In re Care & Treatment of Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 585.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 586. The Court referenced the statue in supporting its holding:
[I]f commitment is ordered, the term of commitment is not indefinite. A person
committed as a sexually violent predator receives an annual review to determine if the
person’s mental abnormality has so changed that commitment is no longer necessary. The
court reviews this report, and even if release is not recommended, the person may file a
petition for release with the court at any time.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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threshold, and the statutory scheme as a whole, is one that rings hollow
today. 85
III. CLINICAL ASSESSMENT WITHIN THE SVP PROCESS
A.

Standard for “Mental Illness”

The requisite mental condition to be used in making an SVP determination
differs throughout several states. 86 The various mental conditions have been
classified as such: (1) mental disorder; (2) mental abnormality; (3) mental
abnormality or personality disorder; and, (4) idiosyncratic definitions. 87 As
mentioned in Part II, Missouri courts use “mental abnormality” as the standard
when making SVP determinations. 88 There are several issues with the use of
the “mental abnormality” standard, as has been pointed out by psychiatric
professionals. 89 In the psychiatric field, mental illness is typically based upon a
DSM-IV diagnosis, which uses structured interviews to come to a medical
conclusion. 90 In contrast to this somewhat “bright-line” standard provided by
the DSM-IV, “mental abnormality” is an ambiguous term that “lacks any
diagnostic precision.” 91 In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court stated it was leaving
it up to the individual states to define such medical terms that have legal
significance. 92 However, the Court added that the mental condition must cause
the individual to have difficulty controlling his or her behavior. 93
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hendricks, the clinical
condition actually causing a loss of “volitional impairment” is essential to SVP
statutes. 94 Thus, the use of an ambiguous term such as “mental abnormality”
creates a problem that is two-fold. First, those assessing individuals during the

85. To see how the standard for committing a sexual predator compares to committing an
individual with other mental health issues, see infra note 90.
86. See Richard Rogers & Rebecca L. Jackson, Sexually Violent Predators: The Risky
Enterprise of Risk Assessment, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 523, 524 (2005).
87. Id.
88. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(2) (2015).
89. See Rogers & Jackson, supra note 86, at 524.
90. Id. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, more
commonly known as DSM-IV, is a manual published by the American Psychiatric Association
and covers all mental health disorders. The manual also lists known causes of these disorders
along with suggested treatment approaches. Christopher L. Heffner, Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV), ALLPSYCH.COM, http://allpsych.com/dis
orders/dsm/ [http://perma.cc/4AUG-LG37] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). “This book is typically
considered the ‘bible’ for any professional who makes psychiatric diagnoses in the United
States.” Id.
91. Rogers & Jackson, supra note 86, at 524.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 525.
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civil commitment process must develop consistently reliable methods to
determine what qualifies a person as having a “mental abnormality” without
having an idea as to the term’s true psychiatric definition. 95 Second, these
mental health professionals must also be able to accurately determine when
such a “mental abnormality” is actually causing volitional impairment. 96 This
is such a difficult task that the American Bar Association (ABA) considers it
nearly impossible. 97 In fact, the ABA has been persistent in supporting the
elimination of the volitional impairment requirement since “there is still no
accurate scientific basis for measuring one’s capacity for self-control or for
calibrating the impairment of such capacity.” 98
B.

Treatment Enigma

The treatment process that the state requires offenders to go through could
certainly be considered counterintuitive. From one perspective, completion of
statutorily required treatment should allow patients to be released, while also
significantly improving their mental health. 99 On the other hand, as this section
will show, certain aspects of required treatment can have serious legal
consequences for the offender. 100 Furthermore, since statistically there is very
little chance of a patient being released, especially in Missouri, there is very
little incentive for an individual to attempt to complete a treatment process
with such little perceived benefit. 101
1.

Legal Consequences for Offenders

Documents generated during treatment can be used in court in an effort to
lengthen the confinement of the participating patient. 102 According to the
SORTS website, their treatment practices mandate an offender, among other
things, admithe or she is a sex offender in need of treatment, disclose prior
offenses, and discuss past unhealthy relationships. 103 Moreover, the Missouri
statute grants the court the authority to order the offender be subject to certain

95. Id.
96. Rogers & Jackson, supra note 86, at 525.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 2093, 2118 (2010).
100. Id.
101. See Bogan, supra note 3. “‘No one has ever graduated from [SORTS] and somewhere
down the line, we have to do that or our treatment processes become a sham,’ Keith Schafer, the
leader of the Department of Mental Health, wrote in an email in 2009.” Id.
102. Anita Schlank & Rick Harry, The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex Offender in
Minnesota: A Review of the Past Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1221, 1223–24 (2003).
103. Program Structure, MO. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://dmh.mo.gov/smmhc/sorts_
programs.html [http://perma.cc/5VLH-BFDH] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016).
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conditions “as deemed necessary,” including “[submitting] to a polygraph,
plethysmograph, or other electronic or behavioral monitoring or assessment;”
and “[authorizing] the department of mental health to access and obtain copies
of confidential records pertaining to evaluation, counseling, treatment, and
other such records and provide the consent necessary for the release of any
such records.” 104 Thus, anything that a patient admits to having done, during
any and all phases of the treatment process, is discoverable.
Prosecutors are certainly aware of such statutory requirements, and, in fact,
many prosecuting attorneys have a practice of obtaining treatment data that
would otherwise be private as part of the pre-petition review to determine
whether to continue confinement. 105 As a result, defense attorneys have
advised offenders that it may be better not to participate in treatment, as they
may actually increase their chances of being released since nonparticipation
may be viewed more favorably than “failing” the treatment process. 106
Offenders have even been quoted as saying they refused treatment because
“their attorney advise[d] them not to,” and “if they enroll, their written
treatment assignments, assessments and progress notes will be subpoenaed by
courts and used to prove they continue to need inpatient detainment and
treatment.” 107
2.

Where Is the Incentive?

In addition to the potentially devastating legal consequences that an
offender may experience because of documents generated during treatment,
there is also very little upside to be gained by actually participating. There are
currently nearly 200 patients confined within the SORTS treatment
facilities. 108 Since the program began in 1999, no one has completed treatment
and been granted an unconditional release. 109 SORTS asserts that the sex
offender treatment program that takes place at their facilities consists of four
phases: (1) pre-engagement/engagement, (2) cognitive restructuring, (3)
emotional integration, and (4) community reintegration. 110 According to the

104. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.505.3 (2015).
105. Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an EmpiricallyBased Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1125 (2003).
106. Deirdre M. D’Orazio et al., The California Sexually Violent Predator Statute: History,
Description & Areas for Improvement, CAL. COALITION ON SEXUAL OFFENDING 27 (Jan. 2009),
http://ccoso.org/sites/default/files/CCOSO%20SVP%20Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5Y9-ZW
U8].
107. Id.
108. Bogan, supra note 3.
109. Id.
110. Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services, UMSL, http://www.umsl.edu/slpic/
Adjunct%20Rotation%20Sites/Sex%20Offender%20Rehabilitation%20and%20Treatment%20
Services.html [http://perma.cc/FG7S-ZAZS] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
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SORTS website, the community reintegration phase is “still under
construction.” 111 The legal consequences of participation combined with the,
perhaps, impossibility of completing treatment has caused a certain group of
SORTS patients to indeed refuse to partake. 112 According to one such patient,
taking part in treatment “would be like admitting he needs therapy.” 113

111. Id. The following descriptions of each of the four phases in the SORTS program were
taken from an internship posting on the University of Missouri-St. Louis website:
• Pre-Engagement/Engagement: “These residents are typically either new to SORTS
treatment or have not yet demonstrated a relatively consistent commitment to change.
Target topics for this Phase include learning to respond appropriately to rules and
authority, admitting one is a sex offender in need of treatment, learning the basics of
SORTS treatment, and making healthier leisure choices.”
• Cognitive Restructuring: “Residents at this stage of treatment are considered to have met
the expectations of the Pre-Engagement/Engagement Phase, including commitment to
change. Target issues for this Phase include increasing awareness of the
thoughts/feelings/behavior process and thinking patterns, disclosing offenses and
developing personal offending cycles, and beginning to address the emotional states
associated with their offending and other unhelpful behaviors.”
• Emotional Integration: “This Phase of treatment focuses on addressing the elements that
we believe lead to long-term change—making substantive changes in leisure activities
and attitudes toward same, accepting and learning appropriate coping strategies for all
emotional states, and dismantling unhelpful core beliefs. This Phase also expects
residents to discuss past unhealthy relationships and begin to learn and practice
developing appropriately intimate relationships with staff and peers.”
• Community Reintegration: “This Phase is still ‘under construction,’ but as the name
suggests, will focus on mastering the skills needed for a return to the community through
gradually decreasing levels of supervision and restriction. Planned activities of this
phase also include college courses, finding meaningful work and housing outside the
facility, family therapy, development of relapse prevention plans, and developing
support networks.”
Id.
112. Jesse Bogan, Violent Sex Predators Locked Away, but Not in Prison, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/violent-sexpredators-locked-away-but-not-in-prison/article_5246e072-8a64-5f41-83f7-6f4fa3ce0cc1.html
[http://perma.cc/7JWQ-7XYZ].
113. Id. The patient referred to is Lester Bradley, the subject of a detailed article in the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch. Bradley does not take part in treatment, claiming that he has paid his debt to
society by already having served fifteen years in prison. Bradley was confined after violating his
parole when babysitting his girlfriend’s ten-year-old daughter. According to a polygraph test, as
well as the girl’s mother, Bradley did not abuse the ten-year-old, but his parole was revoked
nonetheless. A multidisciplinary team of state mental health professionals unanimously agreed
that Bradley should not be committed. Additionally, a forensic psychologist working in the
Department of Mental Health, the department that operates SORTS, determined that Bradley did
not meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator. However, the ultimate decision of whether to
involuntarily confine Bradley fell to the jury, which determined that he did in fact possess the
requisite “mental abnormality.” Bradley has been confined to the SORTS facility since February
of 2013. Id.
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C. Annual Reviews
SORTS-employed psychologists perform the annual reviews of the
residents. 114 Each SORTS facility—the Southeast Missouri Mental Health
Center and the Fulton State Hospital—is assigned one annual reviewer; thus,
the psychologist conducting these reviews is not part of each resident’s
treatment team. 115 SORTS psychologists use the Static-99R to assess the risk
of each individual. 116 Generally, this is a tool that measures static factors
unchangeable in nature, such as an individual’s prior sexual offenses. 117 These
annual reviews are submitted to the courts and include the psychologists’
professional opinions regarding the mental conditions of the SORTS
residents. 118 The annual reviewers also make recommendations concerning
whether the residents continue to meet the requisite statutory criteria for civil
commitment. 119
After evidence was presented at trial in Van Orden v. Schafer, the judge
noted the importance of these annual reviews. 120 Specifically, that it is
practically impossible for a SORTS resident to successfully petition for release
without a review recommending such a release. 121 Furthermore, SORTS
reviewers receive no legal training in understanding or applying the SVP Act’s
criteria for release. 122 At trial, the defendant’s own expert stated that the annual
reviewers did not know how to apply the statutory criteria for risk
assessment. 123 Moreover, the evidence at trial also showed that the annual
reviews failed to include certain relevant information, such as the opinions of
the SORTS treatment providers—who actually are on that particular resident’s
treatment team—regarding a resident’s lowered risk and potential for
release. 124 Therefore, as shown in the Van Orden v. Schafer trial, the annual
review process—which is of vital importance should a resident seek a
conditional release—has several very concerning flaws.

114. Van Orden v. Schafer, No. 4:09-cv-00971 AGF, 2015 WL 5315753, at *11 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 11, 2015).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Van Orden, 2015 WL 5315753, at *11.
120. Id. at *12.
121. Id. at *11.
122. Id.at *12.
123. Id.
124. Van Orden, 2015 WL 5315753, at *12.
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IV. SORTS
A.

Does SORTS “Answer to No One”?

Many internal documents have been made available to the public for the
first time during discovery in Van Orden v. Schafer, including an e-mail from
the director of the Missouri Department of Mental Health in 2009 that read,
“No one has ever graduated from [SORTS] and somewhere down the line, we
have to do that or our treatment process becomes a sham.” 125 The Department
of Mental Health released a statement in 2014, claiming that three residents
had been granted conditional release since 2009. 126 However, those three
individuals were neither allowed to travel far from the SORTS facility nor
were they generally permitted to leave the facility overnight. 127
SORTS categorizes each resident pursuant to one of four risk levels: “High
Risk,” “Moderate Risk,” “Low Risk,” and “No Apparent Risk.” 128 As of 2013,
nearly half of the residents housed at the Farmington facility were considered
“No Apparent Risk.” 129 What makes the fact that Missouri has failed to release
even one single patient since 1999 even more concerning than it already is on
its face is that all of the nearly 200 residents are locked up in the maximum
security facilities in Farmington and Fulton, when such security is unnecessary
for many of the individuals. 130 Although issues pertaining to the involuntary
civil commitment of sex offenders are hardly unique to Missouri, every other
state that has a facility similar to SORTS has been more successful with
respect to rehabilitation and release. 131 Specifically, there are seven other states
that have a similar statutory confinement scheme for sex offenders. 132 The
facilities in all seven, as of 2005, have released at least one patient, with
Illinois, Washington, and Wisconsin releasing no fewer than fifteen patients. 133
In the complaint filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in Van Orden v. Schafer, it
is alleged that the patients who are categorized as being of “No Apparent Risk”

125. Bogan, supra note 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Fifth Amended Complaint at 20, Van Orden v. Schafer, No. 4:09-cv-00971 AGF (E.D.
Mo. Feb. 19, 2014), ECF 258.
129. Id. There were 136 patients being housed in the Farmington facility as of 2013. Sixtytwo of those patients were categorized as being of “No Apparent Risk.” Id. at 21.
130. See id. at 20–21.
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id. The seven states with such facilities are: Wisconsin, Washington, Illinois, Florida,
Kansas, Iowa, and Minnesota. Id.
133. Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 5. Minnesota and Iowa have released one
patient, Kansas has released four, Florida has released six, Illinois has released eighteen,
Washington has released fifteen, and Wisconsin has released forty-six. Id.
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should be housed in the Least Restrictive Alternative (“LRA”). 134 Indeed, the
concept of LRA being applied in cases of the involuntary civil commitment
has been around a long time. 135 In Lessard v. Schmidt, a decision that was later
overturned by the United States Supreme Court, the district court held that
even if an individual is deemed to be mentally ill and a danger to society, the
court should nonetheless “order full-time involuntary hospitalization only as a
last resort,” suggesting that such confinement would certainly not qualify as a
LRA. 136
Many critics of SORTS, and Missouri’s SVP Law in general, have pointed
out that the state essentially uses SORTS as a “prison disguised as a mental
health facility.” 137 Much of this may be due to the perception that SORTS
operates under its own authority, which was perhaps solidified by the
Department of Mental Health’s victory in Strutton v. Meade, decided by the
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 138 Dennis Strutton was a SORTS patient who had
been temporarily suspended from participating in a treatment group as a
disciplinary measure because facility psychologists alleged that he was
disturbing the other patients in the group. 139 Strutton filed suit against the
Department of Mental Health, claiming that his Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights were violated when SORTS did not provide him
with consistent access to adequate mental health treatment. 140 The district court
ultimately held that Strutton did not have “a fundamental right to treatment
while committed to the [Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center].” 141 In
the district court’s analysis, it explained that in order to establish a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the inadequacies in the treatment he received must be “so
arbitrary or egregious as to shock the conscience.” 142 The district court held
that removing Strutton from the therapy group was below the professional

134. Id. at 20.
135. See J.M. Johnston & Robert A. Sherman, Applying the Least Restrictive Alternative
Principle to Treatment Decisions: A Legal and Behavioral Analysis, 16 BEHAV. ANALYST 103,
104 (1993). There are different interpretations of how LRA should apply to a treatment
procedure. First, there is the opinion that “before a procedure can be implemented, all or at least
some less intrusive procedures must have been tried and shown to be ineffective.” Id. at 106.
Another school of thought suggests that only a “reasonable justification” that a less restrictive
procedure would be inappropriate is required. Id.
136. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
137. Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 57.
138. Id. at 9–10; Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012).
139. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554.
140. Id.
141. Id. SORTS was formerly known as the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center. MO.
DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 2.
142. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 554.
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standard but was not “conscience-shockingly deficient.” 143 As a result, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
claim. 144 This decision had major implications for SORTS and its patients, as
the court essentially refused to intervene with the way the facility was run,
even in a situation in which a patient was being denied treatment—the very
purpose for which the facility supposedly exists, and the basis for calling this
process a “treatment” rather than a “punishment.” The problem, then, is that
where there is no honest attempt at rehabilitating these individual, the civil
confinement system is, in effect, issuing life sentences for crimes that these
people have yet to commit.
B.

Fiscal Disaster

SORTS also faces many financial concerns that make its stated mission of
treating and rehabilitating patients a near impossibility. The importance that
the Department of Mental Health places on the SORTS program and the
aforementioned “mission” may be reflected in the funding that is allocated to
the facility. The department computes a number that they refer to as the “Cost
Per Bed Day,” reflecting the average dollar amount per resident that the
department allocates to all of their programs. 145 Out of the six inpatient care
facilities that the department operates, SORTS far and away receives the least
amount of funding. 146 In fact, SORTS receives over $100 less in “Cost Per Bed
Day” than the next lowest funded program. 147 The department has attempted to
justify such low funding by pointing out that sex offenders are the most
difficult patients to treat. 148 The argument would seem to suggest that since the
department considers treating the patients of SORTS to be futile, it would not
be wise to waste significant funding on the facility and its treatment practices.
However, since the goal of rehabilitation is what allows the program to be
constitutional, it would seem to follow that an earnest attempt should be made
at treating these “difficult” patients, which would seemingly require more
funding instead of less. 149
The allocation of funding within the SORTS facility is also an issue.
According to another department metric, SORTS allocates a mere fifteen

143. Id. at 555.
144. Id. at 558.
145. Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 16.
146. Id. The following illustrates the various programs and the funding allocated to them by
the Missouri Department of Mental Health, using the “Cost Per Bed Day” metric: Acute Care–
Child Inpatient: $477; Acute Care–Adult Inpatient: $464; Residential Care–Child: $392;
Correctional Treatment–Inpatient: $343; Long Term Care–Adult Inpatient: $285; MSOTC
(currently known as SORTS): $182. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 16–17.
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percent of its funding to “Treatment Staff.” 150 The Treatment Staff is said to
include: Psychology, Substance Abuse Counselor, Activity Therapy, Social
Work, and Academic Teachers. 151 It is, at the very least, peculiar to have the
fewest dollars allocated to the unit that is responsible for carrying out the very
purpose for which the facilities exist. During discovery in Van Orden v.
Schafer, there were countless internal e-mails uncovered, illustrating the
facility’s intention to cut costs by reducing treatment. 152 Alan Blake, who
formerly served as chief operating officer of SORTS, sent several concerning
e-mails referring to problems within the facilities. 153 In one such e-mail, Blake
referred to a conversation he had with an individual responsible for financing
the facility, in which this individual stated, “If we reduce treatment to 1½ per
week, we can greatly reduce needing to hire more psychologists and social
workers.” 154 In a separate e-mail, Blake wrote, “We have been trying to find
how to make a $600,000 core reduction and the ramifications. [If that happens]
most nursing and medical staff will leave, and most professional staff will
follow. At that point we become a prison.” 155
V. A NEW HOPE FOR CHANGE
After years of frustration for SORTS residents, the recent federal district
court decision in Van Orden v. Schafer may finally provide cause for hope.
The district court held that SORTS “suffers from systemic failures regarding
risk assessment and release that have resulted in the continued confinement of
individuals who no longer meet the criteria for commitment, in violation of the
Due Process Clause.” 156 The court found three “constitutional deficiencies”
with Missouri’s SVP Law:
(1) Defendants have not performed annual reviews in accordance with the SVP
Act, as interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court, and as required by the Due
Process Clause; (2) Defendants have not properly implemented any program to
ensure the least restrictive environment, and have not implemented—or even
designed—the community reintegration phase of the SORTS treatment
programs; and (3) Defendants have not implemented release procedures,

150. Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 17.
151. Id. at 18. The following is a list of services within SORTS, and the percentage of facility
funding that each “unit” is allocated: Medical–18%; Unit Security–42%; Housekeeping,
Maintenance, External Security, Food Service, Accounting, Administration–25%. Id.
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id. at 13.
155. Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 15 (emphasis in original).
156. Van Orden v. Schafer, No. 4:09-cv-00971 AGF, 2015 WL 5315753, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 11, 2015).
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including director authorization for releases, in the manner required by the
157
SVP Act and the Due Process Clause.

With respect to the first deficiency, the court noted that the SORTS annual
reviewers had not been applying the correct legal standard in evaluating
whether or not an individual met the requirements for conditional release. 158 At
trial, defendant’s expert testified that SORTS-Fulton annual reviewers were
failing to recommend the conditional release of certain residents even though
they no longer met the “dangerousness” requirement for confinement. 159 When
analyzing the second deficiency, the court pointed out that the stated goal of
SORTS, which is treating residents to the point where they could be
reintegrated into society, was observed in theory only, not in practice. 160 In
other words, SORTS was simply not completing the last phase of its
program. 161 As to the third constitutional deficiency, the court found that
SORTS appeared to be blocking the director approval necessary for an
individual resident to obtain a release. 162 The director has not authorized a
single resident to petition for conditional release. 163 These findings, as a whole,
seem to be supported by the factual background surrounding the SORTS
program, as detailed in this Comment. One can hope that this decision sets a
true foundation for significant reform within Missouri’s involuntary civil
confinement system.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the success rate, or lack thereof, that SORTS has had in
treating patients, the courts must act. The reason why this burden falls upon the
judicial branch, quite frankly, is because no other government office will be
inclined to act in order to erect significant changes with respect to Missouri’s
SVP Law. Certainly, the legislature has the power to amend and pass new laws
that would address some of the concerns covered in this Comment. However, it
is impractical to expect a politician to advocate for such changes. The truth of
the matter is that the individuals confined in SORTS and other sex offenders
are perhaps the most unpopular group of individuals in society. No politician,
whether he or she is seeking reelection or not, is going to argue that more of
these people should be released to live amongst the general voting population
of Missouri. Even if a state senator or representative truly believed that

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at *29.
Id. at *28.
Id.
Id.
Van Orden, 2015 WL 5315753, at *28.
Id. at *29.
Id.
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Missouri’s SVP Law was unconstitutional, he or she would be committing
“political suicide” by choosing to advocate for statutory change.
In the past, justices on both the United States Supreme Court and the
Missouri Supreme Court expressed concerns about the application of
involuntary civil confinement schemes for sex offenders. 164 Justice Kennedy
alluded to the dangerous possibility that the civil system could be used to
confine offenders for the rest of their lives if the statutory goals of treatment
were a mere pretext to permanently remove certain individuals from society. 165
Judge Wolff further elaborated on this concern in his concurring opinion in In
re Care & Treatment of Norton. 166 Judge Wolff pointed out that the concept
behind civil confinement is not only to protect society but also to treat “sick”
patients so they can be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. 167
Furthermore, Judge Wolff wisely analyzed that the years after the enactment of
the statute would allow the courts to see if the practices of the Department of
Health and SORTS were sincere attempts to treat patients so they may be
released, or whether these offenders were to be “warehoused without treatment
and without meaningful efforts to re-integrate them into society.” 168
After fourteen years of the SORTS program, it would seem that the fears
of Justice Kennedy and, specifically Judge Wolff, have come to fruition—that
Missouri’s sex offender civil commitment scheme has become a way to impose
life sentences based upon the psychological categorization of an individual.
The fact that zero patients have been granted unconditional release since the
beginning of the program, combined with the lack of resources dedicated to
treatment, lends support to the argument that the program has not been
practiced in accordance with the legislature’s initial intent. 169 Rather, based on
these facts, it would seem that these offenders indeed are simply being
“warehoused,” where they are serving what is essentially a life sentence. 170

164. See In re Care & Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
165. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371–73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166. Norton, 123 S.W.3d at 176–82 (Wolff, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 176.
168. Id.
169. See supra Part IV; Bogan, supra note 3.
170. See Norton, 123 S.W.3d at 176 (Wolff, J., concurring). Comparing these offenders’
confinement to a prison sentence may actually not be doing it justice. In many ways, the SORTS
facilities are harsher and more restrictive than even a maximum security prison. For example,
while prisoners can typically frequent the library or gym anytime, seven days per week, SORTS
only allows patients to visit the library and gym for one or two hours per week; prisoners are
allowed to sleep as late as they wish, while SORTS residents are required to be awake by 7:00
a.m.; prisoners can bathe as often as they wish, while SORTS patients are allowed one shower per
day; prisoners can walk freely to meals, while SORTS residents must be escorted; prisoners have
two men to a cell, while SORTS houses four to a “room”; and prisoners are allowed up to four
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However, with the recent decision in Van Orden v. Schafer, there may be some
hope yet. For the first time since the creation of SORTS, a judicial court has
acknowledged that Missouri’s SVP Law is being applied in an unconstitutional
manner. 171 In Minnesota, the state that adopted one of the first sex offender
civil commitment statutes, a federal court has appointed a task force that
recommended major reforms to their current program. 172 Perhaps the
appropriate next step for Missouri is a similar program. An idea that for a time
seemed to qualify as wishful thinking, now seems like it actually may be
possible after the federal court’s decision in Van Orden. It will be efforts such
as these that initiate change with respect to these involuntary civil confinement
laws. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter was once quoted as saying, “It
is a fair summary of constitutional history that the landmarks of our liberties
have often been forged in cases involving not very nice people.” 173 It has
always been the province and duty of the courts in this country to protect the
rights and liberties of all individuals, no matter how unpopular they may be.
SAM NEWMAN*

visitors per week, while SORTS only allows visitors on weekends and only if approximately two
weeks notice is given to the facilities. Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 50–52.
171. Van Orden v. Schafer, No. 4:09-cv-00971 AGF, 2015 WL 5315753, at *29 (E.D. Mo.
Sept. 11, 2015).
172. Id.
173. Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, U.S. HISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/10.
asp [http://perma.cc/C68K-T9DY] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). Here are some examples of less
than exemplary citizens who have successfully challenged the government’s deprivation of
certain liberties: “A pick ax murderer on death row who found God and asked for clemency; a
publisher of magazines, books, and photos convicted for sending obscene materials through the
United States mail; a convict whose electrocution was botched when 2,000 volts of electricity
rushed into his body, causing flames to leap from his head; a university student criminally
charged for writing and publishing on the internet about torturing and murdering women.” Id.
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